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I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, I will consider how law, religion, and democratic pluralism revolve around a particular issue: global migration. I use the term
"global migration" to encompass a number of related issues that are often
collapsed under the term "immigration." In nations that have constructed
their identities around waves o f settlers or migrants—places lik e the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—immigration involves the formal reception of foreigners into the host country as potential new citizens! T h is is just one part of the migration o f peoples
around the globe. Migration also encompasses emigration, asylum, economic migration, and undocumented or irregular immigration. This larger collection of human movements presents new challenges to democratic nations in a global environment in which most have explicitly
committed themselves to certain fundamental, democratic values and
human rights norms. Furthermore, these same values relate closely to
core notions of Christianity. Catholic social teaching is a tradition within
Christianity that emphasizes the dignity o f the human person and, as
such, complements and supports key liberal values essential to democracy and modem human rights discourse.
Global migration demonstrates the difficult choices a firm commitment to these values presents to even the most advanced democracies.
In the United States, undocumented migration from Mexico and Central
America has caused a great deal of political and social turmoil; has ex-
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posed ugly, nativist tendencies in American culture; and has exacerbated
class tensions, calling into question the American commitment to an
open society that welcomes the poor and persecuted.
2
Nevertheless, the American debate over undocumented immigration and immigration reform offers an excellent way to frame progressive
and creative ideas about the relationship between Catholic social thought
and democratic pluralism. In this essay, I will demonstrate how religious
ideas can be used to strengthen our democratic commitment to universal
human rights. Both Catholic social teaching and various strains of liberal
political theory point to similar paths our of dilemmas over the admission
and status of migrants in democratic societies. Moreover, both reveal
new ways these societies might reform notions of citizenship and membership in ways that offer equality of esteem to all human beings.
My essay is organized around three major themes. First, I explore
_the ways in which Catholic social teaching addresses human dignity, the
plight of the poor, and the promotion of global justice. I argue that this
theme provides an important bridge between secular and religious conceptions of human rights,
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Strangers No Longer, the bishops of the United States and Mexico summarized the current state of Catholic teaching:
The Church recognizes the right of a sovereign state to control its
borders in furtherance of the common good. I t also recognizes the
right of human persons to migrate so that they can realize their Godgiven rights. These teachings complement each other. While the
sovereign state may impose reasonable limits on immigration, the
common good is not served when the basic human rights of the individual are violated. I n the current condition of the world, in
which global poverty and persecution are rampant, the presumption
is that persons must migrate in order to support and protect themselves and that nations who are able to receive them should do so
whenever possible?
This general statement draws on a number of key principles o f
Catholic social teaching that, although sensitive to the needs of the nation-state to promote the common good o f its citizen-members, ultimately give priority to the needs of immigrants and migrants in most
situations. For the purposes of this essay, I will highlight four principles:
the dignity of the human person, the person in community, the common
good, and the preferential option for the poor.
The dignity o f the human person in Catholic social teaching is
based on an understanding of men and women as created in God's image
and likeness. This concept, known as the imago Dei, means that human
beings have a unique relationship with the divine, a relationship rooted in
the idea of the Incarnation—God taking human form. Human dignity is
not negotiable or earned. I t is not dependent on our attributes or our behavior. I t is an inseparable part of our humanity and it is the driving
force behind the Christian notion that human life is sacred. T o promote
and protect the dignity of human life, Catholic social teaching sees human beings as inherently social beings whose personalities can be fully
realized only in relationships with others.
The person in community is another core principle of Catholic social teaching. This is one principle in which Catholic teaching and tradition part with social contract theories of liberalism. Social contract theories typically proceed from an understanding of a "state of nature" in
which human beings were lone rights-bearers who eventually had to cede
individual rights to the community or the state in recognition of the ne-

3. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, A Pastoral Letter Concerning Migration from the
Catholic Bishops o f Mexico and the United States 11 3 9 (Jan. 22, 2003) , available a t
http://www.usccb.orginirsistrangershtml.
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cessity of joining together in certain instances!' T his foundational assumption of the autonomous individual creates an environment in which
claims of community are seen as negative intrusions on human dignity.
These claims serve a need so critical that the intrusion they cause to individual autonomy or self-ownership can reasonably be seen as a lesser
evil. On the other hand, Catholic social teaching views community as an
essential part of human existence, inseparable from any meaningful understanding of what is required to pursue a life of dignity! The life of an
individual is not diminished when certain aspects of one's autonomy are
sacrificed to strengthen community but enhanced. T h e emphasis o f
Catholic social teaching on the social dimension of the person has meant
that Catholic thinking typically sees an essential role for states in the enhancement of the well-being of both citizens and the community.
Promotion of the common good is a third core principle of Catholic
social teaching. U nlik e those whose perspectives are rooted in social
contract theory, Catholic social teaching does not see the common good
as the sum of the good of individuals—an empty space in which individuals have as much freedom as possible to maximize their own vision
of the good.
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unmet. "Contributive justice requires that citizens be active members of
the community, using their agency not only for their own good but for
the good of the community as well."
justice
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u
a
t for the poor, a fourth concept of Catholic
social teaching, arises when these visions of justice are considered in
e
tandem with the common good." Serious attention to the common good,
human dignity, and the social nature of the human person makes the preferential option for the poor a logical outgrowth of those principles."
Both the Hebrew Scriptures and the Gospels are heavily imbued with
admonitions to the faithful to direct their attention to the needs of the
poor. The preferential option takes this scriptural tradition, and the tradition of Catholic social teaching, and draws from them an understanding
that Christians are obliged to be specially concerned with the poor.
"Preferential" is not preference in the sense that the poor are "better" than other people or more loved by God. Preferential means that a
Christian's attention must first be directed to the weak, the outcast, and
the marginalized. Thus, when we consider human dignity, life in community, and the common good, we must be particularly aware of the
needs of the least powerful among us. H ow do our economic, political,
and legal decisions affect those who are least able to speak for themselves and who are more often than not in the worst position to bear sacrifices that might be necessary for the common good? The preferential
option is about making decisions after first considering how the least
amongst us will fare and, in this way, is a particularization of the broader
notions of contributive and distributive justice.

10.M at 196.
11. Id. at 197. Another useful description of the various forms of justice in the Catholic social
tradition can be found in ECONOMIC JUSTICEFOR ALL, supra note 5.
12. The concept grew out of discussions of the Latin American bishops that began at Medallin,
Columbia, in 1968 and thereafter developed by the theologian Gustavo Gutierrez. See generally
GUSTAVOGUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGYOF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SALVATION (Sister
Caridad lnda and John Eaglson eds. & trans., rev. ed. 1988) (1971).
13. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus 11 57 (May 1, 1991),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_fatherijohn_paul_iiiencyclicalsidocuments/hf
051991_centesimus-annus_en.html.
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THEPLURALIST REALITYOFMODERN DEMOCRACY
The current condition of most Western democracies is one in which
people from numerous ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds find
themselves living together, sharing public space, and struggling to forge
community out of diversity. Within these democracies, there is widespread agreement on the acceptability of certain constitutional or basic
law norms. One of these principles is that all human beings should enjoy
equality of esteem.
[flach of us counts w e are each equally worthy of esteem. This
esteem is not on account of what we do, or how we look, or how
bright we are, or what colour we are, or where we come from, or
our ethnic group: it is simply on account of the fact that we are.
What esteem requires of us is that we see individuals a s first and
foremost particular persons, just like us. Human rights is in this
sense a visibility project: its driving focus is to get us to see the
people around us, particularly those whom we might otherwise
not see at all, or those whom we would try to ignore if we did catch
a glimpse of them. I t follows that, at its core, human rights is a subject that is concerned with the outsider, with the marginalised, and
with the powerless.
14
The concept of the equal dignity of all human persons finds expression in
different ways in different systems, but it is something that all legitimate
democracies embrace, as is evidenced in numerous international agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Indeed, the
principle finds widespread support around the world, and it forms the
basis of international human rights. Although many nations pay only lipservice to this idea, most nations feel obliged to justify their actions
based on the shared global understanding of the centrality of this equality
norm.
Yet, even in mature and flourishing democracies, difficulties with
the idea o f equality often arise. Religious or ethical differences may
produce conflicts in which citizens may agree on a value, like equality of
esteem writ large, but disagree on its application in particular cases.
Such disagreement creates very difficult conditions for the formation of
coherent law and policy. Take, for example, the issue of abortion in the
United States. Although most Americans believe abortion should be illegal in some cases,
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reaches a stage of development in which it should be treated as a human
being." T his disagreement extends within and across religious traditions, as well as between religious believers and non-believers.
Furthermore, even when specific applications of these principles are
not at issue, differences of opinion often exist as to why a particular principle deserves support or what types of behavior the principle encompasses. F o r example, despite general agreement in French and British
civil society on the basic equality principle, is equality o f esteem advanced or undermined when Muslim women in France wear headscarves
in public schools? Should Muslim women fully covered in the chador be
allowed to present themselves to vote in British elections without revealing their faces? Even in a state where Islam is the dominant religion, like
Turkey, these questions have caused extraordinary controversy when
considered in light of the core values of a secular, democratic state. One
fairly straightforward application of the principle of equality is respect
for individual conscience. As Martha Nussbaum noted,
[T]he argument for religious liberty and equality in the [American
constitutional] tradition begins from a special respect for the faculty
in human beings with which they search for life's ultimate meaning.
This faculty was held to be present in all human beings in such a
way as to make human beings equal: anyone who has it (and all
humans do) is worthy of boundless respect, and that respect should
be equally given to high and low, male and female, to members of
the religions one likes and also to members of religions one hates.
17
Thus, democratic citizenship does not necessarily demand shared
agreement on the first principles underlying the constitutional or basic
law of the state; yet, accession to and respect for the core values and
principles of the basic law are necessary if the society is to have stability
and cohesion. This means the concept of a nation as coterminous with a
core ethnic, racial, or religious homogeneity is increasingly unsustainable
if our commitments to human rights, like freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and freedom from ethnic and religious discrimination,
are to flourish in democratic settings." T his does, however, raise the

Oppose Same-Sex Marriage Quirmipiac University National Poll Finds, But They Don't Want Government to Ban It (July 17,2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1295.xml?Release ID-1194.
16. See Yuval Levin, Public Opinion and the Embryo Debates, THE NEW ATLANTIS, Spring
2008, at 47- 62, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publicationsipublic-opinion-and-theembryo-debates.
17. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTYOFCONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSEOF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19 (2007).
18. For a contrary view, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO
AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004). I consider and reject Huntington's view and offer an alter-
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question of whether democratic states can be organized around the idea
of giving priority of place to certain cultural attributes of a dominant
group of citizens, like language in Quebec or Judaism in Israel.
19 Forcing immigrants and migrants to completely abandon their previous identities and commitments in order to enter in full relationship
with the members of their new, host societies seems inconsistent with the
values of democratic pluralism. T h e old assimilation models that coerced immigrants to become more ethnically French, English, or American—whatever that meant—are no longer acceptable in many Western
democracies.
sel
2° ves primarily as the recipients o f acts o f beneficence or charity in
which
I n c rthey
e atake on the posture of grateful supplicants willing to do whatever
s i nitgtakes
l y , to "fi t in." Today, respect for cultural diversity, human
rights,
and
m i g global justice in democratic societies suggests that immigrants
may
r ahave
n certain entitlements to entry, as well as a right to shape their
new societies.
t s
The global economy and global inequality demand a more complex
a
understanding of why people migrate. Lac k of economic opportunity
n
around the world has made it impossible for many people to achieve a
d
basic standard of living for themselves, much less raise their standards of
iliving
m in ways that would allow them to form families and raise healthy
m
i I n some countries, like the Philippines, men and women with
children.
g r
professional
qualifications find that, while no suitable employment is
a
n
t
available in their home countries, their skills are in demand in other placs around the world. Add to this the never-ending cycle of war, famine,
es
d political repression that victimizes millions, as well as the ethically
and
burdened
relationships many developed nations have both with their
o
former
colonies and with nations whose puppet-regimes long did their
n
bidding.
A l l of these issues contribute to the "push" and "pull" factors
o
that
encourage
all types of global migration.
t
Once migrants arrive in wealthy, pluralist democracies, new quess
tions
arise
concerning the migrants' place in the social and the political
e
fabric of their host nations. We see increasingly that the models of ase
similation and homogenization of nation-state cultures are falling out of
tfavor:
h
e
m
native view in my recent book: VINCENT D. ROUGEAU, CHRISTIANS IN THE AMERICAN EMPIRE:
-FAITH AND CITIZENSHIP IN THENEW WORLDORDER (2008).
19. For two interesting perspectives on this question, see CHARLES 'TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTS 186 (1995) and Na'ama Carmi, Immigration Policy: Between Demographic Considerations and Preservation of Culture, 2 LAW & ETHICSOF Hum. RTS. (Issue I, art. 14) (2008).
20. Will Kymlicka & Keith Banting, Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State,
20.3 Ermcs & INT1 AFT. 281, 288 (2006).

2009] C a t h o l i c Social Teaching & Global Migration

3 5 1

A wide range of justifications have been offered historically for this
pursuit of national homogeneity. I n some contexts, it was argued
that the state needed to be more unified in order to effectively defend itself against external or internal enemies . . . . But these sorts
of justifications were also typically buttressed by racialist and ethnocentric ideologies which asserted that the language and culture of
minority groups and indigenous peoples were backward and inferior, if not barbaric, unworthy of respect or protection.
21
This recognition has led to the development of the idea of liberal,
multicultural states. I n such an environment, it becomes difficult to insist that immigrants abandon their previous identities and commitments
in order to become members of their host societies. Furthermore, given
the important questions of global injustice that have caused much of the
movement of peoples around the world, it is inappropriate to see migrants and immigrants as supplicants who are lucky to be admitted. I f
notions of justice and responsibility are taken seriously, immigrants and
migrants have certain entitlements of entry and rights to shape their host
society going forward. Relationship and dialogue that respect human
dignity assume that both parties have the right to define the terms of the
association and to influence the outcome of the discussion.
IV. THE GLOBAL COMMONGOOD
Over the last fifty years, these principles have been given global
applicability. Although the principles of Catholic social teaching and
liberal democracy were developed through the observation of social and
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21. KYMLICKA, supra note 1, at 64-65.
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authority operates on a world basis no longer corresrd to the objective requirements of the universal common good." 2
Catholic social teaching is directed to a global social question. T h e
common good the teachings describe is not only the good produced by
life within societies, but also a global common good resulting from the
interaction of nation-states. I t is in light of these principles and their international ramifications that we should consider the tremendous intellectual support Catholic social teaching can bring to a discussion of how to
create a better system to regulate global migration. The Catholic values,
which assume the dignity of the migrant, recognize the dramatic imbalance of wealth and power in the global order and grant a preferential option towards migrants. These values should be a necessary part of any
solution that can legitimately claim to be just.
When Catholic social teaching is considered in the context of the
current global debate around migration, there is a clear nexus between
the teaching and international human rights discourse. Catholic social
teaching does not recognize nation-state sovereignty as a legitimate bar
to migrants' quests to secure the minimal conditions necessary to dignified human existence. Thus, all nations, within the limits of their ability,
have a moral responsibility to accept refugees and asylum seekers. This,
however, is a fairly basic requirement. States may well have an obligation to accept immigrants and other migrants because Catholic teaching
and modem international law are moving—or perhaps more appropriately, lurching—away from the idea of the Westphalian nation-state as
the only model for the organization of the global order. This obligation
may extend even to those who move for reasons beyond basic survival.
Historically, European and North American nations were able to integrate diverse peoples into their "empires" through a political and economic system that depended heavily upon their ability to dominate
weaker nations and force certain cultural standards on subject peoples.
By imposing economic relations and cultural values on those societies
and their populations, these subordinate nations were brought into a
global system on terms designed to favor the dominant world powers.
The modem conundrum is: can a global system continue to work if it is
premised on the equality of nation-states, rather than on the domination
and stigmatization o f the weak by the strong?
heavy
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22. Marvin L. Mich, Commentary on Mater et Magistra (Christianity and Social Progress), in
MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 191, 199 (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. ed., 2005) (quoting
Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Pacem in Terris 1 3 4 (Apr. 11, 1963)).
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beings are concerned have become readily apparent over the last century.
Apart from the obvious examples of the two world wars, more recent
crises in the Balkans and the Caucuses have shown the growing incompatibility between democratic values and the notion of ethnically homogenous nation-states. Clearly, the time has come for a serious discussion of alternative ways of understanding the relationship between the
fundamental rights of persons and political authority.
At least six variations of state sovereignty are offered by Simon
Caney in Justice Beyond Borders.
ing, due
24
O ninepart to its strong relationship to the idea of subsidiarity in
pCatholic
a r t social
i c uthought,
l a r is a political framework in which nation-states
lack
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n
have
authority
for
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x,
y,
and
z, but other larger institutions have
w
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h
authority
for
other
matters.
Neither
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o
t
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25 In Catholic social teaching, subsidiarity is a principle that seeks to
empower individuals and groups at every level of society. O n the one
hand, subsidiarity limits the intervention of the state to matters that are
best addressed by those most intimately affected by them. This is often
understood as a negative aspect of solidarity in that it restricts the actions
of the state in the lives of individuals and communities. O n the other
hand, a positive aspect of subsidiarity recognizes that larger groups and
higher structures in society, like the state, are often in the best position to
take on certain tasks to promote the common good, and in so doing, it
allows the lower or smaller groups to accomplish their tasks more effectiv ely .
26 Caney's political model of a less comprehensive state recognizes
that power is distributed based on different needs and competencies at
different levels. I t is an interesting and creative actualization of the subsidiarity idea. I n Great Britain, for instance, there is increasing pressure
for devolution of power to its constituent entities, particularly Scotland.
An important rationale for this is that the interests and needs of the people of Scotland are different enough from those in England that more
decisions need to be made at a political level closer to the people—in
Edinburgh rather than in London. Yet, a quasi-independent or autonomous Scotland would still submit to a host of restrictions on its sovereign
power through its participation in the European Union, including those
involving human rights protections. Thus, an "independent" Scotland
24. SIMON CANEY, JUSTICEBEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICALTHEORY 150-51 (2005).
25. Id at 151.
26. See Johann Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLESOF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING 133, 135-136 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998).
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remains tethered to the European community of nations and the global
community in ways that leave many major aspects of sovereign power to
higher level institutions. After exploring a number of variations and considering historical examples, Caney concludes,
[W]e should not treat the predominately statist character of the
world system for the last three centuries as a fixed feature of the
way the world is. To do so is to ignore the rich variety of earlier political systems. T h e s e points remind us of the important but often neglected fact that there could be, and have been, alternatives to
a statist framework
27
Catholic teaching sees the nation-state as a means for advancing
human dignity through its promotion of the common good. A t different
places and times in history, other means have been better suited to this
task. The 21st century may well be a transitional era in this regard. Indeed, Yasemin Soysal argues that "the emergence of universal personhood is rapidly eroding the territorially bounded nation-state.
[U]niversal entitlements are still basically delivered by the nation-state
but are no longer limited by formal citizenship. T he furthest-going expression of the trend is the transnational citizenship laid down by the
EIJ .''
28 Given the longstanding support in modern Catholic thinking for the
development of global institutions—respecting, of course, the concept of
subsidiarity—and its modern resistance to any direct support for particular geo-political arrangements, there is nothing in the current move away
from the nation-state model that would be inconsistent with the Catholic
emphasis on the dignity of the human person. When this is combined
with Catholic teaching's rich understanding of justice in its commutative,
distributive, and contributive forms, Catholic teaching offers strong support for an approach to global migration that places unique obligations
on the world's wealthiest nations to offer citizenship to a much larger
number of these people than is currently the case. Just as wealthy citizens have obligations to place the needs of their poorest and weakest fellow citizens at the forefront of discussions of law and public policy, so
too must the wealthy nations of the world consider the needs of poorer
nations. This is especially true when confronted with global migration
rooted in disparities of wealth, inequality in the distribution of global
resources, and lack of meaningful social participation for huge numbers
of the world's poor.
27. CANEY, supra note 24, at 151-52.
28. CASTLES & DAVIDSON, supra note 23, at 18 (citing YASEMIN SOYSAL, LIMITS OF
CITIZENSHIP (1994)).
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V. A COSMOPOLITAN VISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
Seyla Benhabib argues that, given the growing consensus around an
understanding of liberalism that sees all human persons as bearers of certain fundamental rights, it is time to recognize a fundamental right for
temporary residents of democratic societies to seek reasonable opportunities for citizenship in democratic societies.
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political community in which an individual finds himself; but, as a theoretical matter, the rights belong to a ll human beings. I n this environment, the concept of citizenship becomes somewhat overburdened:
The discourse o f liberal democracies is necessarily caught in this
tension created by the context- and community-transcending validity dimension of human rights on the one hand, and the historically
formed, culturally generated, and socially shaped specificities of existing juridico-civil communities on the other. Th e point is not to
deny this tension by embracing only one or another of these moral
alternatives, but to negotiate their interdependence, by resituating or
reiterating the universal in concrete contexts.
32

Immigration and migration in the wealthy democracies of the world

provide an ideal "concrete context" in which to examine this interdependence, and Benhabib offers a proposal for negotiating the conflicting
claims o f universal human rights and nation-specific citizenship.
Given the reality o f global migration and the important issues o f
justice that lie at its root, Benhabib argues that a democratic society cannot deny membership in perpetuity to individuals who have entered its
territory. Indeed, the international community has come to regard the
arbitrary denationalization o f an individual as a violation o f basic human
rights norms. Fo r Benhabib, this right to citizenship requires recognition

of a companion right to membership.
33 A right to membership means that once a foreigner is admitted into
a democratic community, he or she must be offered reasonable opportunities to become a member-citizen. Democracies cannot tolerate permanent strangers or second-class, pseudo-citizens. Th e long-term existence
o f these non-members calls into question the community's commitment

to the concept of equality of esteem for all human beings. Michael Walzer noted this in the early 1980s when he considered the status of guest
workers in Europe.
34 One
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a l and
s every
o
resident is a citizen, too o r , at least, a potential citizen.
n oThatt isewhy
d territorial
,
admission is so serious a matter. The members must be prepared to accept, as their own equals in a world of
shared obligations, the men and women they admit; the immigrants
must be prepared to share the obligations.
35

32. BENHABIB, supra note 29, at 133-34.
33. M at 135.
34. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 56-61 (1983).
35. Id. at 52.
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Both Benhabib's and Walzer's observations raise important questions about the status o f undocumented workers in the United States.
Benhabib's vision of just membership would call for reasonable paths to
citizenship for those legally admitted, and it may go further to suggest
that the United States has some obligation to admit a certain number of
"economic refugees" who have been displaced by the gross inequalities
of the global economic system. F or those who have entered legally, the
right to membership entails a right for a foreigner to know how the conditions of naturalization can be fulfilled, and the system in place must be
transparent: "One must not criminalize the immigrant and the foreigner;
one must safeguard their right to due process, to representation in one's
language, and the right to independent counsel."
36 But what about those who have entered sovereign territory in violation of laws of the community in which they now seek to make their
lives? Should they have a right to membership? Although individual
circumstances of undocumented migrants vary, many have crossed into
the territory of the United States as a predictable result of choices freely
made by American political and economic elites. Given the willingness
of large segments of American society to take advantage of the economic
benefits made possible by the availability of inexpensive, undocumented
labor, I argue that the "illegality" of many of these territorial admissions
should represent no more than a hurdle to citizenship for these resident
aliens. When distributive and contributive justice are taken into account,
barring them permanently from citizenship is morally unjustifiable. I t
demeans the American commitment to democracy and human rights.
Furthermore, rounding u p undocumented migrants f o r deportation
smacks of ethnic cleansing, population exchanges, and other attempts to
"purify" national polities; and all of these, in the end, degrade the humanity of everyone involved.
In the case of undocumented migrants to the United States, a huge
portion of these admissions were actively sought by certain Americans,
or were acquiesced in by others. They were the result of what can be
reasonably seen as an immigration policy that illegitimately restricts unskilled labor from the developing world, despite the pressing need for
these workers in numerous sectors of the American economy. Denying
membership to these migrants also ignores the ways in which admission
to citizenship could level the playing field for some of the world's least
advantaged people.

36. BENHABIB, supra note 29, at 140.
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VI. CONCLUSION: COSMOPOLITAN NORMS, DISAGGREGATED
CITIZENSHIP, AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
If we truly believe that core democratic and human rights values are
universal in their scope and application, we must be willing to think
more seriously about a world order based on cosmopolitan norms and
federal structures encompassing nation-states within these norms. A s
Caney has argued, these structures may take any number of forms. The
regional model of the European Union offers one hopeful example, but it
does not have to be the only one. Both Benhabib and Caney suggest that
political identities do not have to be understood in state-centric terms.
Both suggest that devolutionary developments around the world exemplify the use of the principle of subsidiarity as a way to improve democratic participation under a more general, cosmopolitan framework of human rights, political and economic rights, and rich justice norms, as understood in the Catholic social tradition. We are still in the early days of
the development of these alternative structures, and I am not arguing that
the nation-state is no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of
global migration, the growth of world cities, and the expansion of diasporic cultures around the globe (including a Mexican-American one here
in the United States) all suggest that the time has come to reconsider our
understanding of the nation-state.
Domestically, more and more States are being confronted with the
need to operate under multi-cultural political models. W e should encourage this development as part of a richer understanding of how democracies go about the business of respecting human rights and nurturing human dignity. The ugliness and evil that often result from conflating ethnicity with democracy are never far away. In recent months, Radovan Karadzic has been captured and brought to trial at The Hague for
leading a murderous rampage of ethnic cleansing through the Balkans.
His capture, however, has done nothing to stop the Russians from moving into Georgia and unleashing attacks against ethnic Georgians within
Russian territory. The tribal mentality of us versus them is no doubt a
part of human nature, but both the traditions of democratic liberalism and
Catholic humanism have offered alternatives that are just as deeply
rooted in our spiritual and intellectual patrimony.
Fencing the world out is a morally unacceptable choice. The United States and the other democracies of the world have particularly important responsibilities to the global common good, both as the wealthiest
members of the community of nations and as believers in, and promoters
of, the existence of universal human rights. As citizens of a democracy,
we must understand that decisions to migrate are rarely products of individual choices alone, but tend to be the result of complex interactions of
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personal, domestic, and global forces. We must, therefore, acknowledge
our role in the creation or maintenance of some of those forces, and we
must also decide what types of legal and policy decisions are consistent
with our moral and political commitments.
Democratic pluralism requires compromise in the public sphere.
As the ethnic and religious make-up of our nations change, we cannot
impose a static understanding of what is acceptable based solely on the
prejudices of previously dominant ethno-cultural groups, particularly if it
creates impossible tensions with our commitments to democratic principles and widely held human rights norms. Religious values and the
voices of people of faith have a positive role to play in relieving this tension. Catholic social thought offers one perspective that is both personcentered and cosmopolitan. I t does not unduly elevate the sovereignty of
the nation-state, but draws a parallel between the individual in the domestic community and the nation-state within the international community, emphasizing rights and corresponding duties that limit unfettered
action of both the individual and the nation-state.
Finally, Benhabib's right to membership links core values of Catholic social teaching and Catholic understanding of justice to important
modem currents of liberal political theory. Everyone has the right to belong to communities in which they can exercise the full range of activities that bring dignity to their lives. I f this kind of membership and participation cannot be achieved in one place, how can we justify preventing
human beings from realizing these opportunities elsewhere, particularly
when places exist that can accommodate them? Every person has a right
to dignified participation in the lives of communities of which he or she
is a part, regardless of legal status. Mos t importantly, everyone has a
right to be a person fully endowed with rights and duties—a someone,
somewhere.

